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THE GRAND JURY: TRUE TRIBUNAL OF
THE PEOPLE
or

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE
PROSECUTOR?
JAMES P. SHANNONt.
In a petition to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, Thomas Jefferson once termed the Anglo-Saxon tradition
of trial by grand and petit jury "The true tribunal of the people." '
Both before and after Jefferson's time the citizens of Virginia and of
the nation have had abundant reason to cherish the constitutional
requirement that criminal charges cannot be brought against any
person in this country except by the indictment of a grand jury.
More recently, however, as numerous weaknesses in the modem
operation of the grand jury system have come to light, several voices
have been raised to question the continuation of this instrumentality
of criminal justice. In a feature article for the New York Times, Leon
Friedman, a staff attorney for the Association of the Bar of New
York City, recently wrote: "The actions of grand juries in recent
cases-such as The Pentagon Papers affair-... have led to charges
that the juries have lost their way." 2
In his report Friedman fists specific reasons for the current loss of
public confidence in grand juries:
Recent critics of the grand jury have questioned whether it does
exercise an independent function or is merely a rubber stamp for the
prosecutor;... [whether] minority groups are underrepresented on
grand jury panels;... [and whether] it has been used to harrass
dissident groups and unfriendly witnesses who [appear] before it.
By custom and statute the grand jury is now regarded as a jury of
inquiry, convened to hear the evidence adduced by the state, and to
determine whether on its face that evidence warrants bringing a
suspect person to trial.3 Once that decision is reached in a given
instance the grand jury has, or should have, no further interest in
tB.A., College of St. Thomas; M.A., U. of Minnesota; Ph.D., Yale University; ordained
Roman Catholic Priest; Auxiliary Bishop of St. Paul-Minneapolis; past President, College of
Si Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota; past Vice-President, St. John's College, Santa Fe, New
Mexico; presently student, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. The Complete Jefferson 128 (S. Padover ed. 1943) [hereinafter cited as Padoverl.
2. Friedman, Grand Juries: Strange Doings By The "Honest Countrymen," N.Y. Times,
Nov. 7, 1971, at E8, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Friedman].
3. Black's Law Dictionary 993 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

that particular allegedly criminal cause. It is also settled law that the
grand jury is neither supposed to be an agency of the prosecuting
attorney nor of the police officers preferring charges against an
accused.4

In contrast to this official and statutory description of the grand
jury, it is the central thesis of this paper that the grand jury, as an
instrument of criminal justice, has become in effect an administrative
arm of the office of attorney general or district attorney, that it no
longer enjoys public confidence, is frequently a device for the miscarriage of justice, that its merits no longer balance its documented
deficiencies and that criminal indictment by a grand jury should be
replaced by the simpler more expeditious and equitable method of
criminal information filed by a public prosecutor.'
If this sweeping proposition surprises the reader it is hoped that
the following historical synopsis and contemporary analysis of what
the grand jury has become in the hands of modern prosecutors will at
least lessen that surprise if not convert the reader to the point of
view that the grand jury, as a regular instrument of returning criminal
indictments, has outlived its usefulness.
The grand jury has an honorable history in Anglo-Saxon common
law. Its precise origin is not known with certitude.
Trial by jury ... is not the creature of an act of Parliament.... It

arose silently and gradually, out of the usages of a state of society
which has forever passed away.... Few subjects have exercised the

ingenuity and baffled the research of the historian more than the
origin of the jury.6

Some historians see the beginnings of the jury in the Inquisitio of
the Frankish courts of Carolingian kings.' Some say the jury came to
England with William the Conqueror (1066).8 Whenever it began it
4. 38 C.J.S. Grand Juries § 1 (1943).
S. It is not here recommended that the grand jury be abolished entirely but that it be no
longer used as the usual instrumentality for bringing suspected persons to trial by means of
indictment (as distinguished from the filing of a criminal information by the prosecutor).
The extensive survey of judges and attorneys, apropos grand juries, conducted in 1930 by
Wayne Morse (later U.S. Senator) of Oregon, specifically concluded that the true and
enduring value of the grand jury would lie in its usefulness as an instrumentality for investigating charges of corruption among holders of public office. This conclusion of the
Morse study, cited below at note 6, is probably even more valid today than when it was
published four decades ago.
6. Forsyth, Trial By Jury 1-2 (1875), quoted in Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury
System, 10 Ore. L. Rev. 102 n. 2 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Morse].
7. W. Holdsworth, History Of English Law 312 (1922), quoted in Morse, supra note 6, at
104 n. 11.
8. F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History Of English Law 143 (2d ed. 1898), quoted in
Morse, supra note 6, at 106 n. 25.
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had been firmly established as an essential element in English law by
the end of the reign of Henry II(1189). 9
By the middle of the fourteenth century certain procedural difficulties began to appear when accusing juries (le graunde inquest)
presented a suspect for trial, tried his case to a jury made up of some
members from the original accusing jury, and then found him not
guilty. By statute in 1352 an indictor was forbidden to sit on the
trial jury of a person accused of felony or trespass if the accused
challenged the juror. This statute is generally accepted as marking the
first clear cut distinction between the jury of presentment (grand
jury) and the trial jury (petit jury).' 0
By royal decree in 1368 Edward III formalized the procedure of
the grand jury in criminal actions by fixing the number of jurors at
twenty-three and by declaring a majority vote of that number necessary to prefer an indictment.'
Apropos the focus of the present paper it is worth noting that the
grand jury began, not as an adjunct of a court of justice, but as an
administrative agency of the king. The Domesday Book compiled in
the reign of William the Conqueror was in effect the work-product of
a primitive form of the grand jury. The task of that body at that date
was to determine the name and location of every person in the
kingdom and to ascertain the extent of his real and personal property
for purposes of levying royal taxes.' 2
As the grand jury came to be used more widely in criminal cases,
English citizens came to regard it less and less as an agency of the
Crown and to rely on it as a shield protecting them from arbitrary
prosecution by the Crown or false charges by their neighbors. In
1682 in the reign of Charles II, Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper, the first
Earl of Shaftesbury, was charged with high treason and brought before a grand jury. When that body reviewed the evidence and refused
to indict, Sir John Somers, then Lord Chancellor of England, said,
"Grand juries are our only security, inasmuch as our lives cannot be
drawn into jeopardy by all the malicious crafts of the devil, unless
such a number of our honest countrymen shall be satisfied in the
truth of the accusations."' I
In this passage Lord Somers reflects the traditional view still held
by most Americans of the grand jury as a shield to protect accused
9. Morse, supra note 6, at 107.
10. Id. at 114.
11. Reeves, 3 History Of The English Law 133 (

116 n. 71.

), cited in Morse, supra note 6, at

12. T. Plucknett, A Concise History Of The Common Law 112 (5th ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as Plucknett].
13. Friedman, supra note 2, at coL 1.
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persons from the zeal of over-eager prosecutors and to protect the
public interest from criminal injuries of every kind. It is precisely this
popular and trusting view which the present paper seeks to question.
By the time of the American Revolution the grand jury was an
accepted part of English criminal procedure and was readily incorporated into the American Bill of Rights. In fact, the earnest conviction of the founding fathers about the basic importance of the grand
jury as a guarantee of personal rights poses a constitutional dilemma
today for those who would propose an alternative method of
bringing criminal charges.' I
In his endorsement of a Bill of Rights, Thomas Jefferson called the
right of trial by jury and the requirement of indictment by grand
jury the "sacred palladium of liberty."' I After passage of the first
ten amendments to the Constitution, Jefferson knew that the Fifth
Amendment and Article 3, Section 2, Part 3, of the original Constitution were only minimal statements of the right of trial by jury. He
continued to worry and to write about how this historic guarantee of
liberty could be protected and further refined. With deeper insight
than most of his peers he realized that the quality of justice in any
court using a jury could only be protected if the persons called to
jury duty were persons of integrity, prudence and independent
judgment.
In the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, 1798, Jefferson
proposed a plan to insure the selection of competent jurors for duty
on grand and petit juries. After listing a catalog of all the ills which
might result from ignorant, venal, avaricious, or prejudiced jurors, he
urged that the selection of jurors be left neither to chance nor to the
choice of members of the executive or judiciary bodies. Expressing
the hope that his fellow legislators might apprehend the danger of
the "gangrenous" infection of incompetent or misguided jurors
deciding important civil and criminal questions, Jefferson urged them
to arrest this malady before it could "reach the vitals of our political
existence."'6
His positive suggestion for guarding the integrity of both kinds of
juries was that persons be elected to this position.
[It is proposed] that the inhabitants of every precinct ... elect from
among themselves someone to be a juror, that from among those so
chosen in every county someone may be designated by lot, who shall
14. U.S. Const. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or an indictment of a Grand Jury ......
15. Padover, supra note 1, at 121.
16. Id. at 127.
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attend the ensuing session of the federal court within the state to act
as grand and petty jurors, one of those from every senatorial district
being designated by lot for a grand juror, and the residue attending
to serve as petty jurors to be in like manner designated by lot in
every particular case.... [A] n institution of this outline ....so
modified as to guard it against the intrigues of parties, the influence
of power, or the irregularities of conduct, and further matured from
time to time as experience shall develop its imperfections, may long
preserve the trial by jury, in its pure and original spirit, as the true
tribunal of the people, for a mitigation in the execution of hard laws
when the power of preventing their passage is lost, and may afford
some protection to persecuted man, whether alien or citizen, which
1
the aspect of the times warns we may want. 7 (Emphasis added.)
The focus of Jefferson's concern in each of these passages is on the
protection assured to personal liberty by the grand and petit juries.
Another perspicacious observer, visiting this country in its youth,
who had been reared under the Civil Code of France, saw the Ameri-

can jury as more than merely an instrument of justice in a given trial

at law. Alexis de Tocqueville perceived in the democratic American
jury system, as contrasted with what he considered the generally
aristocratic aura of the English jury, an enormously powerful political
tool for the education of the American citizenry in its rights and
duties.' 8
The modern historian can only puzzle over what reaction that
remarkable Frenchman would have today if he could compare the
reality of the operation of our grand juries with the sanguine predictions he made for them in 183 1:
The jury contributes most powerfully to form the judgment and to
increase the natural intelligence of a people, and this is, in my
opinion, its greatest advantage. It may be regarded as a gratuitous
public school ever open, in which every juror learns to exercise his
rights, enters into daily communication with the most learned and
enlightened members of the upper classes, and becomes practically
acquainted with the laws of his country, which are brought within
the reach of his capacity by the efforts of the bar, the advice of the
judge, and even the passions of the parties. ...I do not know
whether the jury is useful to those who are in litigation; but I am
certain it is highly beneficial to those who decide the litigation; ...it [is] one of the most efficacious means for the education
of the people which society can employ.... Thus the jury, which is
17. Id. at 128.
18. A. De Tocqueville, Democracy In America 178 (H. Commager ed. H. Reeve transl.
1947) [hereinafter cited as de Tocquevillel.
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the most energetic means of making the people rule, is also the most
efficacious means of teaching it to rule welL 19 (Emphasis added.)

The present writer respectfully submits that in this euphoric prediction de Tocqueville's fond hopes have simply not been realized by
the actual development of the grand jury. Even the most convinced
exponent of indictment by grand jury could not today seriously
endorse de Tocqueville's opinion that the grand jury does in fact
"make the people rule" or that it does in fact teach them
"to rule
well." Quite the contrary, the grand jury, in modem practice has
become a most unreliable instrument for assuring the independent
power and the education of the people.
In the passages cited above from Somers, Jefferson, de Tocqueville, and the United States Constitution, several unspoken but
important premises are that grand jurors:
1. will be selected by impartial means;
2. will be broadly representative of their community;
3. will be persons largely free of antecedent bias or prejudice on
the questions before them;
4. will not be under the influence or direction of the public
prosecutor;
5. will somehow be able to provide leadership of their own, sufficient to insure the independence of their action and the freedom of their judgment.
It is not possible to say categorically that all five of these necessary qualifications are regularly missing among most grand jury
members today; but it is easily possible to defend the proposition
that most of these requisites are absent in grand juries so often and
so consistently today as to warrant the opinion that the grand jury
has become in effect an administrative arm of the office of the public
prosecutor and that by this transition from its original lofty and
admirable purposes it often injures both the civil rights of the
accused and, conversely, violates the common good of society by its
selective and arbitrary enforcement of the law.
In reaching these conclusions the present writer makes no allegation or even veiled implication that the misuse of grand juries by
prosecutors today results from any malicious effort by these public
officers to pervert the system of criminal justice in our courts. If
there is a villain in this story it is the American public which continues to adhere to a myth of grand jury integrity at the same time
that it encourages prosecutors to act on the premise that ends justify
means and that civil liberties can be abused by the courts in the
19. Id. at 181-182.
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interest of some greater good apprehended by the vision of the
prosecutor and by that portion of the citizenry for whom he considers himself guardian and spokesman. In support of this position
five case histories from recent grand jury deliberations, one in
Illinois, one in Ohio, and three in New Mexico, are summarized
below.

THE KILLING OF FRED HAMPTOM
AND
MARK CLARK
On December 4, 1969, at 4:45 A.M. fourteen Chicago police officers in plain clothes, under the direction of State's Attorney
Edward V. Hanrahan, staged a surprise raid on an apartment at 2337
West Monroe Avenue, the Chicago headquarters of the Black Panther
Party. The officers had a search warrant authorizing them to look for
illegal weapons.
In a sudden fusillade of gunfire two occupants of the apartment,
Fred Hampton, Chairman of the Illinois Black Panther Party, and
Mark Clark, a Panther Party leader from Peoria, were killed. Hampton was killed lying in bed. Clark was killed sitting in a chair facing
the front door of the apartment.2 0 State's Attorney Hanrahan later
the
alleged that it was "conclusively proved that Panthers opened
2
'
battle by firing a shotgun blast through the apartment door."
Leaders of the Black Panther Party then charged that the deaths of
Hampton and Clark constituted murder, demanded an investigation
of their deaths, and invited the public to examine their blood-stained
and bullet-spattered apartment. Hundreds of citizens accepted the
invitation to tour the apartment.2 2
Responding to widespread public criticism of the police raid,
State's Attorney Hanrahan issued a statement, commending the
members of the police raiding party for "their bravery, remarkable
and their discipline in the face of this vicious Panther
self-restraint,
23
attack.",
In response to mounting public questioning of exactly what happened in the raid, the U.S. Department of Justice, acting through the
§

20. Thompson, The Case That Wouldn't Fade Away, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 29, 1971,
I-A, at 1, col. 1. [hereinafter cited as Thompson].

21. Hough, Major Events In The Black PantherCase, Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 25, 1971,
at 11, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Hough].
22. Interview with Patrick Whalen, Assistant Attorney General, State of New Mexico, in
Santa Fe, New Mexico, November 26, 1971. Mr. Whalen was one of those allowed to inspect

the Chicago apartment the day after the killings.
23. Hough, supra note 21.
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U.S. District Attorney in Illinois, convened a special federal grand
jury on December 19, 1969, to investigate the killings. 2 4
On January 18, 1970, the Chicago coroner's jury made public its
decision that the deaths of Hampton and Clark by police officers
constituted justifiable homicide. 2
On January 30, 1970, the Cook County Grand Jury indicted the
seven surviving Black Panther members who were in the party headquarters the night of the raid, charging them with various crimes,
including that of attempt to commit murder. 2 6
On May 8, 1970, acting for the State of Illinois, Hanrahan suddenly dropped all these charges against the indicted Panthers. 2 7
On May 16, 1970, the federal grand jury issued a 243 page report
of its findings, severely criticizing the Chicago Police Department for
the conduct of the raid and the Chicago coroner for his report on the
deaths of Hampton and Clark. A crucial portion of the federal grand
jury's report, based on analyses by the crime laboratory of the F.B.I.
found that 99 shots had been fired in the raid, that 82 of these were
proved to have been fired by the police and that only I could be
proved to have been fired by any of the nine occupants of the
apartment. 2 8
Earlier testimony by Chicago police officers and by Hanrahan had
firmly maintained that the police fired their weapons only after
Panthers had first opened fire with a shotgun. The federal grand jury
report stated, apropos these allegations:
[U] nder questioning a Chicago police firearms examiner told the
jury that the state's attorney's office pressured him into signing the
[erroneous] report before he could examine all the evidence. He said
he was told he would be fired if he refused to sign. 2 S,
In a summary of the federal grand jury's conclusions, a writer for
the Wall Street Journalsaid:
The report was highly critical of the way the state's attorney's police
handled physical evidence after the raid, noting that they preserved
no fingerprints and failed to record or systematically identify the
seized weapons. The post-raid performance of the Chicago Police
Internal Inspection Division, which is supposed to investigate police
performance, "was so seriously deficient that it suggested purposeful
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at col. 2.

27. Id.

28. Klein, When a Grand Jury isEmbarrassing,Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1971, at 8,
coL 6 [hereinafter cited as Klein).
29. Id.
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malfeasance. The raid was i-conceived... not professionally
planned [nor] properly executed." 3
The Wall Street Journal in the same article concluded that the
state's attorney's office in effect admitted that the indictments
against the surviving Panthers were based on erroneous evidence by
dismissing them.
Public response to the findings of the federal grand jury and to the
decision by Hanrahan to drop all charges against the previously indicted Panthers amounted to an uproar. Petitions from 87 civic and
legal associations promptly demanded further investigation of the
killings. 3

1

On June 27, 1970, Chief Judge of the Chicago Criminal Court,
Joseph A. Power, ordered the convening of a special Cook County
Grand Jury and named a prominent and highly respected Chicago
attorney, Barnabas F. Sears, to be the special prosecutor for the
investigation.3 2 This grand jury was sworn in on December 7th and
convened for the first time on December 7, 1970."
As special prosecutor, Barnabas Sears was assisted by four Chicago
attorneys appointed by the court. Each of these attorneys was then
and is now in private practice in Chicago. After almost five months
of quiet and extensive investigation the special Cook County Grand
Jury voted on April 21, 1971, to indict State's Attorney Edward V.
Hanrahan and twelve members of the Chicago Police Department for
criminal conspiracy in the deaths of Hampton and Clark.3"
On Apriil 22nd, the day following the vote, and before that vote
was made public, Judge Power summoned Barnabas Sears, his staff,
and all 23 members of the grand jury into a closed door conference.
Judge Power then ordered the Grand Jury to hear further testimony
by Hanrahan and certain, other witnesses who had testified earlier to
the federal grand jury.3
At this conference, Judge Power also directed the grand jury not
to deliberate on any further indictment until after all the witnesses
proposed by him had been heard. Sears refused to comply with the
directives of the judge, stating that Power was "exceeding his authority.9 3 6 The privacy of this exchange was broken on April 26th when
defense attorneys (representing several police officers) charged in
30. Id.

31. Thompson, supra note 20, at 1, col. 1.
32. Klein, supra note 28, at col. 6: "Sears... is a former president of the American Trial
Lawyers' Association."

33. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 6, 1971, at 5, col. 4.
34. Id. at col. 1.
35. Hough, supra note 21, at 11, col. 2.
36. Thompson, supra note 20, at 1, coL 6.
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open court that Sears had improperly pressured grand jury members
to vote for indictment and called for dismissal of the grand jury on
grounds that its deliberations had been "tainted." '3 "
In open court on April 26th Judge Power repeated his order to
Sears to call Hanrahan and other specified witnesses before the grand
jury. Sears again refused, saying, "No judge may interfere with or
frustrate the proceedings or deliberations of the grand jury." 3 8
Angry, red-faced and frequently pounding the table, Judge Power
excoriated Sears in open court for not calling the additional witnesses before the grand jury. "I now order you to subpoena all
witnesses," he said. "I don't care who they are. I want them all to
appear. Are you going to do that?"
Sears replied.

.

. "I cannot submit to your direction.... You hon-

estly believe you have the power you are seeking to exercise. You
have absolutely no such power at all. It would impeach the integrity
of the grand jury ....
3 I would be in violation of my oath (as
special prosecutor) if I were to submit4 0to the order and domination
of your honor, and I therefore refuse."
Before the hearing of April 26th ended, Judge Power ordered
Sears to pay a fine of $100 for his "contemptuous attitude" and
ordered a continuing fime of $50 an hour against Sears, to run 24
hours a day, for as long as Sears refused to call the witnesses Judge
Power wanted the grand jury to hear. 4
On May 4th Sears appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court asking it
to set aside the fines levied against him by Judge Power and to set
guidelines "to guide the future conduct of the special grand jury that
is investigating a matter of grave public concern." 4 2 Without waiting
for directions from the Supreme Court Judge Power ruled that he did
have the authority to decide whether Sears had improperly influenced the decision of the Grand Jury. Power then summoned the
foreman of the jury to his chambers for a private conference and
later did the same with two other grand jurors.4 3
On June 23rd the Supreme Court ruled that Sears was not in
contempt of court by his refusal to call additional witnesses as
ordered by Judge Power. The court also set aside the fines ordered
37. Id; Hough, supra note 21, at 11, col. 2-3.
38. Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 26, 1971, at 3, col. 3.
39. Thompson, supra note 20, at 1, col. 6.
40. Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 26, 1971, at 1, col. 1; Hough, supra note 21, at 11, col. 3:
"'Sears agreed to hear grand jury testimony by Hanrahan, but refused to subpoena the
federal witnesses as ordered by Judge Power."
41. Thompson, supra note 20, at 1, col. 6.
42. Id. at 6, col. 1.
43. Id.
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by Power, and told him that he had no authority to meet privately
with them as a
with members of the Grand Jury and could only 4meet
4
meeting.
a
such
requested
they
group and only if
During May and early June the Grand Jury did hear extended
testimony (25 hours in ten sessions) from Hanrahan, and then voted
a second time (on June 24th) to return a true bill indicting him and
4
the twelve Chicago police officers. 1 On June 25th the formal indictment, contained in a sealed envelope, was delivered by special
6
prosecutor Sears to Judge Power. 4 Power accepted delivery, but did
not open the envelope, and told Sears he did not intend to make
public the findings of the grand jury and that he was appointing a
filed
special investigator to look into charges of improper procedures
47
indictment.
the
in
named
officers
against Sears by the police
On August 13, 1971, Sears asked the Supreme Court of Illinois to
order Judge Power to make public the suppressed indictment, to
revoke the appointment of the special investigator, and to drop the
4 8 On August 14th, the
charges of misconduct filed against Sears.
Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court personally ordered the
charges against Sears to be postponed indefinitely; and on August
24th, the Court ordered Judge Power to make public the indictments
4 9 Power
and to rescind his appointment of the special investigator.
complied with both directives at once, thus making formal and
public charges of criminal conspiracy against State's Attorney Edward V. Hanrahan and twelve members of the Chicago Police Department.5 o
No date has yet been set for the trial of these charges. However,
100 civic and legal associations, including the Chicago Bar Association, the Chicago Crime Commission, and the Chicago Council of
Lawyers, have petitioned Hanrahan and the police officers indicted
with him to take a leave of absence from their official posts until the
In similar
criminal charges pending against them are resolved.'
suspended
has
Department
Police
Chicago
the
situations in the past
its officers but had not done so in this instance. Neither Hanrahan
2
nor any of the twelve officers has offered to take leave voluntarily.'
As these indictments await trial, it is germane to the present dis44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at col. 2.
Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 6, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
Thompson, supra note 20, at 6, col. 2.
Hough, supm note 21, at 11, col. 3.
Id.
Id.
Thompson, supra note 20, at 6, col. 6.
Chicago Daily News, Sept. 11, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
Id. at 1, col. 2.
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cussion to note that the Illinois statute governing the use of deadly
force by a police officer effecting arrest carefully defines the precise
limits of his exercise of this unusual authority.5 Whenever final
judgment is made of the actions of the Chicago police officers who
took the lives of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, such judgment must
find its validity in the specific terms of this particular statute.
THE KILLING OF ALLISON KRAUSE, JEFFREY MILLER.
54
SANDRA SCHEUER, AND WILLIAM SCHROEDER
Kent, Ohio, is a small college town (population 31,500). Its biggest industry is Kent State University (22,000 students), often called
the largest unknown university in the country. Students there tend
to be. first-generation collegians, from comfortable working class
families. It has never been known for radicalism or activist students,
even though it has seen five sizeable student rallies between 1968 and
1970.
These rallies, against the war in Vietnam, were orderly and peaceful. Four of them ended in a march to the Campus Commons which
students and faculty have come to regard as a kind of Hyde Park
where dissent can be safely expressed.
All college campuses are, or should be, alert for the annual "May
Madness" which afflicts students near the end of the school year.
Once upon a time this annual malady produced nothing more serious
than panty-raids and contests among eaters of live goldfish.
Since Vietnam the "May Madness" has been the occasion for
increasingly serious protests by students against the war. May 1,
1970 (a Friday), was an unusually warm day in Ohio. Students at
Kent gathered that evening in the two drug stores and six bars which
are the center of local social life. About 11 P.M. a group began
shouting antiwar slogans in a street along the "strip."
53. Peace Officer's Use of Force in Making Arrest (A) a peace officer ... is justified in
the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest and of
any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another from
bodily harm while making the arrest. However, he is justified in using force likely to cause
death or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or such other person, or when he reasonably
believes both that:
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by
resistance or escape; and
(2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony or
is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that
he will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 7-5 (Smith-Hurd 1964). (Emphasis added.)
54. Lewis, The Kent Story: An Eyewitness Account, American Report, Nov. 12, 1971,
at 3-S, col. 3. American Report is a fortnightly Review of Religion and American Power,
published in New York by the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam.
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Curious patrons from the crowded bars moved to the street to
hear the chanting. When the police arrived their first action was to
close the bars. This move sent about 500 more persons into the
streets. Displaced and angry bar patrons then began to toss rocks
through store windows. Using tear gas the police pushed the crowd
back to the campus. By 2 A.M. all was calm in Kent. Only 50 store
windows had been broken. No one had been injured.
The next morning (Saturday) student leaders, faculty members
and townspeople were apprehensive that the aftermath of the night
before might provoke trouble. By evening a crowd of 500 students
was milling about the Campus Commons. The old R.O.T.C. building,
a converted W.W.II barracks, was a natural target. Its windows were
soon shattered. Someone soaked a rag in gasoline drained from a
parked motorcycle, ignited it, and tossed it through a broken window. When firemen tried to stop the fire their hoses were cut. The
building was destroyed.
At 9:30 P.M. (Saturday) the Ohio National Guard, called out by
Governor James Rhodes, moved onto the campus. The commanding
officer decreed that they were there in order "to protect lives and
property" on the campus. Sunday morning Governor Rhodes himself
arrived and promptly changed the orders of the Guard, directing
them "to break up any assembly on campus whether peaceful or
violent. " Before leaving the campus the Governor revealed his intention to ask the legislature to make rock-throwing a felony in Ohio.
By Monday morning, after a night in which one student had been
bayonneted, "the students were angry, the Guardsmen were weary,
the town merchants short-tempered, and the university officials
powerless."' s Just before noon on Monday a crowd of students
began to gather on the Campus Commons. One professor who was
present said later there wrere about 600 in the crowd.
Shortly after noon (Monday), the Guard ordered the crowd to
disperse and even though the students did begin to disperse, the
Guard fired tear gas cannisters into the crowd. Before any rifle shots
were fired the crowd had split into three groups, each heading for a
different part of the campus.
At this point a portion of the Guardsmen turned sharply and
marched up a hill, away from the students. Then, suddenly, some
Guardsmen turned back and fired on the students with live ammunition. The Scranton Committee, appointed by President Nixon, later
reported that at this time 29 Guardsmen fired 61 rounds in 13
seconds. Nine students were injured by rifle fire and four were killed.
The dead were: Allison Krause, Jeffrey Miller, Sandra Scheuer,
55. Id.at 3, col. 3.
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and William Schroeder. These four deaths occurred on May 4, 1970.
On June 13th President Nixon named William Scranton, former
Governor of Pennsylvania, Chairman of a national Commission on
Campus Unrest and ordered the commission to investigate what
happened at Kent State.
Ronald Kane, County Prosecutor for Portage County, in which
Kent is located, stated publicly that he would convene a county
grand jury to investigate the Kent State killings. On August 3rd
Governor Rhodes ordered the Attorney General of Ohio to convene
a special state grand jury to investigate the killings, thus blocking
County Prosecutor Kane who had announced he would subpoena
Governor Rhodes to testify before the county grand jury. 6
On September 26th the Scranton Committee completed its report
to President Nixon, concluding that "The indiscriminate firing of
rifles into the crowd of students and the deaths that followed were
unnecessary, unwarranted and inexcusable." ' '
On October 16th the Ohio State Special Grand Jury returned its
verdicts, exonerating the National Guard and its members from any
responsibility for the deaths of four students and the injuries to nine
others. The Ohio Special Grand Jury also at this time indicted one
professor and 24 students for alleged offenses ranging from arson to
first degree riot.' '
On October 24th Governor Rhodes named three attorneys as
special counsel to prosecute the persons indicted by the Ohio State
Special Grand Jury. One of these attorneys, Seabury Ford, then told
newsmen, "The National Guardsmen should have shot all the troublemakers [at Kent State] ."' I
On October 31 st the New York Times made public a report by the
F.B.I. which said there was "reason to believe that the claim by the
National Guard that their lives were endangered by the students was
fabricated subsequent to the event."'6 On the same day a suit was
brought in Federal Court in Cleveland to have the report and the
indictments of the Special Grand Jury dismissed. 6'
On November 9th Robert I. White, then President of Kent State,
labeled the report of the grand jury "inaccurate" and said that it
"disregarded clear evidence" opposed to its findings.6 2 On December
56. Kent State Revisited: A Chronology of Events, American Report, Nov. 12, 1971, at
2, coL 1 (Special Supplement) [hereinafter cited as American Report].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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3rd U.S. Senator Stephen Young of Ohio charged that the Ohio
Grand Jury was "conceived in fraud and fakery ...to clear Governor
Rhodes of the blame for his abominable blunder." 6 3
On January 28, 1971, U.S. District Judge William K. Thomas
ordered the Special Grand Jury report expunged from the records in
Ohio but allowed the grand jury's indictment of 25 persons to
stand.6 4
On July 21, 1971, U.S. Senator George McGovern, addressing the
U.S. Senate, called the report of the Ohio Grand Jury "a whitewash
of the agents of government involved in the events that led to the
[Kent State] killings." McGovern then called for "a Federal Grand
6
Jury to investigate the killings." S
On July 22nd, Congressman William Moorhead (D.Pa.) entered in
the Congressional Record his opinion that "murder has been committed at Kent State." 6 6 Citing a report by Dr. Peter Davies on the
Kent State killings, Moorhead said, "I hope that the work of Dr.
Davies and the thousands of hours put into this investigation by
friends and relatives of the four slain students is not wasted." The
detailed and painstaking Davies report charged that 8 or 10 National
Guardsmen had privately conspired to use live ammunition to quiet
student unrest at Kent State and that, on a pre-arranged signal, from
a commanding hilltop position, they had all wheeled and fired in
unison, just as they had agreed in advance. 67
On August 13th, John Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General, expressed
his personal sorrow and that of the Department of Justice to the
parents of the four students killed at Kent State and then announced
that, despite the conclusions of the Scranton Committee, there
would be no further investigation of the Kent State killings, and that
the files
of the Justice Department on this case were being closed at
6 8

once.

On September 30th Ohio's 8th District Court of Appeals, upheld
the suit of Arthur Krause against the State of Ohio in a $2 million
wrongful death action on behalf of his daughter, Allison, who had
been killed. Rejecting the state's argument of sovereign immunity,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had erred in dismissing
the Krause suit and ordered it back to trial a second time, saying,
"The State of Ohio is responsible ... for the tortious acts of its
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2, col. 2.

66. Id
67. Davies, Kent State: An Appeal for Justice, American Report, Nov. 12, 1971, at 17-S,
col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Davies].

68. American Report, supra note 56, at 1l-S, col. 1.
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authorized agents. ' 6 9 Thus far no second trial has been convened to
hear this civil suit.
On October 20th, Dr. Glenn Olds, newly appointed President of
Kent State, went to Washington to present to President Nixon a
petition signed by a majority of the Kent State faculty and student
body asking the President to convene a Federal Grand Jury to resolve
"in the dignity of our federal court system" the conflicting reports
about the killings at Kent State. 7 To date no further action has
been taken by the President or the Department of Justice on this
request.
The most penetrating analysis of what happened at Kent State is a
227 page report by Dr. Peter Davies, a New York insurance broker.
Davies' report, entitled "An Appeal For Justice," is a devastating
attack, alleging the miscarriage of justice in Ohio and a damning
indictment of the Ohio State Special Grand Jury. 7'
The conduct of National Guardsmen on active duty in Ohio is
governed by the Ohio Code of Military Affairs. This code has astem
statute governing the act of killing by military personnel. 7 2 The key
69. Id. at 2, col. 3.
70. Id.
71. Davies, supra note 67, at 19-S, col. 1-2. The conclusion of the report merits quoting:
To deny the existence of an element in our society whose hatred for student
protestors is such they not only approve of the killings, but genuinely wish
more had been shot, is to deny a reality. To assume that a uniform whether of
the police or the National Guard, cleanses the wearer of his prejudices is to
assume they are not human beings....
[B] y what law do we deny the parents of those killed and wounded the right
to know exactly what ... the F.B.I. investigation found concerning their
children that day, especially those who were shot to death.... This is not a
police state where people are shot down by militia and the nation compelled
to accept without question the reasons given by those responsible for the
shooting....
Four human lives ... may very well have been deliberately taken by a number
of men using their uniform, anonymity, and subsequent lies to satisfy their
personal animosity toward a "class of persons" they had decided were long
overdue for punishment. It was, as one Guardsman said, "Time they got it like
that." That this might be possible is deeply disturbing... because it raises
the ... spectre of another My Lai.... We would much prefer to let the dead
rest in peace and the reasons why they are dead at ages 19 and 20 remain
buried with them.
Unfortunately, however, we must also reconcile their deaths with our Constitution and our laws. We would rather forget about Kent State than face up to
this challenge. Why?
72. Any person subject to this code who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills
a human being, when he:
(A) Has a premeditated design to kill;
(B) Intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm;
(C) Is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to others and evinces a
wanton disregard of human life; or
(D) Is engaged in the perpetration of [a felony];
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words in this statute, apropos the Kent State killings are "without
justification or excuse" and "unlawfully kills." The crimes and
penalties specified in this statute do not apply if the killing in question was done "lawfully" or "with justification."
The fact that the National Guard in Ohio has chosen not to invoke
this statute against any Guardsman indicates that the state commander of the National Guard and his legal advisors are satisfied that
the deaths of the four students at Kent State were, in some sense,
"justified." The Ohio Grand Jury obviously concurs in this opinion.
This judgment, however, on its face, is directly contrary to the
Anglo-American common law tradition of respect for human life as
an ultimate value. It is still an open question whether the judgment
of the Ohio Grand Jury and National Guard is as offensive to the
American citizenry at large as it is to students of the law.

73
THE KILLING OF PAUL GREEN

Sometime between January and April of 1971 Nancy Crowe and
Paul Green decided that they were in love and would soon be married. Nancy, recently divorced, had an infant son in her custody. Paul
was unmarried. Nancy's mother, Mrs. Ethel Tappan, was bitterly
opposed to the forthcoming marriage and made it her business to
inform the police in Ruidoso, New Mexico, that Nancy and Paul
were living together as man and wife although they were not yet
formally married.
On April 23rd, in mid-afternoon, Ruidoso Police Chief 0. S. Montes
and another officer went to the Sierra Blanca Cabins where Paul and
Nancy and the baby lived and where Paul worked as a handyman.
Chief Montes did not produce a warrant. Alleging that he had a
formal complaint, Chief Montes arrested Nancy Crowe and Paul
Green on a charge of lewd cohabitation. To this date no signed
complaint and no warrant for the arrests have been made public by
the Ruidoso police.
The criminal charge of unlawful cohabitation is classified by
statute in New Mexico as warranting, for a first conviction, a warning
by the judge not to continue such conduct; and only if the parties
is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except
that if found guilty under division (A) or (D) of this section, he shall suffer death or
imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5924.118 (Page
Supp. 1970).
73. Beaumont, Three Police Killings, The New Mexico Review, Aug.-Sept. 1971, at 6-8.
Unless otherwise noted this detailed and analytical article is the source of the factual
material in this section of this paper [hereinafter cited as Beaumont].
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persist in this practice after such a warning are they considered guilty
of a petty misdemeanor. 7
Appearing in Ruidoso Municipal Court on the afternoon of their
arrest Paul and Nancy admitted that they were living together, thus
pleading guilty under the statute. Municipal Judge Austin H.
Pritchett found them both guilty, suspended Nancy's sentence, and
sentenced Paul to 30 days in jail and a fine of $100. Before being
sentenced neither Paul nor Nancy had been represented by counsel.
After being released Nancy went to their home. Paul asked permission to telephone an attorney. While being allowed to make this call
he spotted an open door leading to the outside, and though hampered by a recent and severe axe-wound in the instep of his right
foot, he decided to makea break and bolted for the open door.
What happened next is not precisely clear from the record. Police
officer Victor Brooks who was guarding Green later testified that he
called out to Green, "Stop, or I'll shoot" and that Green responded,
"Go ahead."' This exchange of words, as reported, is disputed.
What is not disputed is that Officer Brooks, at a distance of 200
feet, fired two shots from his .38 calibre service revolver. One shot
struck Paul Green in the back of his head at the base of the skull and
killed him instantly.
Officer Brooks was then arrested on a warrant signed by the Assistant District Attorney for Lincoln County. The charge was voluntary manslaughter. It has since been alleged that Brooks was reassured by the District Attorney that he should not worry about the
charge, because "the grand jury would take care of it."' 6
By a decree of George P. White, Mayor of Ruidoso, May 18th was
74. The New Mexico statute governing this crime reads, in its entirety, as follows:
Unlawful cohabitation consists of persons who are not married to each other
cohabiting together as man and wife.
Whoever commits unlawful cohabitation upon the first conviction shall be
warned by the judge to cease and desist such unlawful cohabitation.
Whoever persists in committing the crime of unlawful cohabitation after being
warned is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-10-2 (Repl.
1964) (Emphasis added.)
75. Beaumont, supra note 73, at 7, col. 3.
76. Id at 8, col. 1. This allegation is repeated in The New Mexico Review, Dec. 1971, at
4, col. 3: "An informed source within the state legal system confided to The Review that
following Brooks' arrest, the D.A. told him not to worry because 'the grand jury would take
care of it.' " This issue of the New Mexico Review also carries an important postscript to the
story of Paul Green. James Rowen, in The Politicsof Murder, at 4, col. 3, quotes a letter
dated May 13, 1971, written by E. H. Williams, Jr., District Attorney for Lincoln County,
New Mexico, to R. E. Thompson, counsel for Thomas Green, the brother of Paul Green.
The letter reads: "While we ie. the office of the D.A. do not attempt to impose our will or
wishes on a grand jury, since this is not our purpose, nor permitted by law. I think it is
accepted that in presentingevidence and working with the Grand Jury, the prosecution is in
a good position to make its views known." (Emphasis added.)
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declared to be "Victor Brooks Fund Day." Fourteen service stations
in Ruidoso agreed to donate to the defense fund for Victor Brooks
one cent from the sale of every gallon of gasoline sold at their pumps
on that day. A special account was opened in the Security Bank to
receive donations for the Brooks Defense Fund. Mayor White and
Alfred Gonzales, a building contractor, urged their fellow citizens to
be generous to the fund.
In the end the fund was not needed and Victor Brooks Day was
never held because on May 12th the Grand Jury of Lincoln County,
after examining all the facts in the killing of Paul Green, declared
that the actions of Officer Brooks on April 23rd constituted justifiable homicide under the laws of New Mexico and that Brooks was
free of all criminal charges. 7
Three of the four sections of the New Mexico statute governing
justifiable homicide by a police officer do not apply to the facts in
the Green case. Section A refers to a death sentence ordered by a
court. Green's death was not ordered by the court. Sections C and D
refer only to fleeing felons. Green was not a felon. Hence section B is
the only part of the statute which could possibly make the killing of
Green justifiable by law in New Mexico, and then only if it could be
said by a competent court or jury that his death was necessary to
"execute some legal process or to the discharge of any other legal
duty." Clearly Officer Brooks had a duty under the law to keep
Green in custody. In order to fulfill this duty, was it necessary that
Officer Brooks kill Green? The Grand Jury of Lincoln County said
"yes" and closed the case.
77. In the light of this verdict it is pertinent to cite the precise terminology of that
portion of the Criminal Code of New Mexico which defines justifiable homicide committed
by a police officer:
Homicide is justifiable when committed by a public officer ....
A. in obedience to any judgment of a competent court;
B. when necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to the execution of some legal process or to the discharge of any other legal duty;
C. when necessarily committed in retaking felons who have been rescued or
who have escaped, or when necessarily committed in arresting felons
fleeing from justice; or
D. when necessarily committed in order to prevent the escape of a felon from
any place of lawful custody or confinement. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-7
(RepL. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
In New Mexico escape from jail by one "lawfully committed to ... jail" is a fourth degree
felony. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-22-8 (Repl. 1964). By involing this statute one could argue
that Paul Green, though convicted only of a misdemeanor, was, in attempting to escape
from jail, a fleeing felon and therefore vulnerable to the use of deadly force by his jailers.
However, the invocation of this statute raises the correlative and more difficult question of
whether Paul Green's conviction and sentencing constituted lawful commitment under New
Mexico Statute 40A-10-2, supra note 74, defining unlawful cohabitation as a petty misdemeanor and fixing a warning, not a jail term, as the statutory penalty for a second

offense.
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Paul Green now lies buried in Gate of Heaven Cemetery, in Aspen
Hills, Maryland. According to the verdict of a grand jury of his fellow
citizens in Ruidoso, his death was "necessary" for the common good
of the citizens of New Mexico.
THE KILLING OF ROY GALLEGOS 78

Before dawn on the morning of June 22, 1971, a tourist who had
parked his mobile home for the night near the Capitol in Santa Fe,
New Mexico, reported to the State Police that a burglary was in
progress at the Free Fraser Pharmacy on College Street. Within a
block of this pharmacy that night more than a dozen State Police
officers and National Guardsmen were on active patrol, guarding
state buildings as a precaution following rumors of possible civil
disorders in Santa Fe. In the wake of widespread riots a week earlier
in Albuquerque, Santa Fe was alert and apprehensive.
State Police arrived at the pharmacy in minutes and promptly
arrested three male suspects. Before Santa Fe City Police arrived all
three youths were securely in the custody of the State Police. One of
those arrested, Roy Gallegos, age 19, was at the time of his arrest
allegedly very much under the influence of some drug or narcotic.
After being turned over to City Police Officer Vance Mabry,
young Gallegos made a break for freedom. It is uncontested that
there were at least ten eyewitnesses to what happened next. It is also
uncontested that Officer Mabry then drew his .38 calibre service
revolver, fired one shot at the fleeing suspect, from a distance of 100
feet. The one bullet entered the back of Gallegos' head. He was
pronounced dead on arrival at St. Vincent's Hospital, Santa Fe.
In subsequent efforts to explain exactly what happened the night
Roy Gallegos was killed, two sharply different accounts were given
to the public. One of these came from Santa Fe Police Chief Felix
Lujan, the other from Father Miguel Baca, a Franciscan Friar, assistant pastor of St. Anne's Catholic Church in Santa Fe, who is also
a confidant of two youth groups in Santa Fe, La Gente and La
Juventud del Barrio de Cristo Rey.
The account of Chief Lujan contains the following statements:
1. When Officer Mabry arrived on the scene of the alleged
burglary, all three suspects were safely in the custody of State
Police officers;
2. When Gallegos broke away, Officer Mabry shouted several
warnings to him;
78. Roy Gallegos, The New Mexico Review, Aug.-Sept. 1971, at 11-12 [hereinafter cited
as Gallegos). Unless otherwise noted all the factual material in this story of Roy Gallegos'
death is taken from this article, written by the staff of The New Mexico Review.
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3. Gallegos refused to halt;
4. Mabry then fired one and only one shot at Gallegos;
5. Gallegos fell to the pavement, was rushed to the hospital, and
was pronounced dead on arrival;
6. At least 10 eyewitnesses were present at the killing.
In sharp contrast to these allegations, Father Baca's report on the
incident alleges that:
1. Gallegos had both hands handcuffed behind his back when he
was shot;
2. A state police officer was running after Gallegos and was but a
few steps away from him at the moment he was killed;
3. Gallegos was running directly toward a large number of state
police and national guardsmen who could easily have apprehended him without violence;
4. Other officers shouted to Officer Mabry, "Don't shoot";
5. The locked handcuffs were removed, at least partially, from
Gallegos after he was shot;
6. Gallegos was under the influence of drugs at the time he was
shot;
7. Gallegos resided in Santa Fe, was well known to the Santa Fe
Police, and, had he escaped, could have been easily located and
arrested later.
It should be noted that neither Chief Lujan nor Father Baca was
present at the scene of the killing. However, it is "known that the
State Police report ... contains the same accounts of the killing
which Father Baca released [to the press] ."I
Roy Gallegos was killed on June 22nd. Father Baca made his
account public nine days later on July Ist. The next day, Santa Fe
County District Attorney James Thompson announced that the
grand jury of that county would convene on July 19th to determine
whether any criminal charges should be filed against Officer Mabry.
In his announcement Thompson contradicted the earlier testimony
of Chief Lujan and alleged that the shot which killed Gallegos was
not aimed at him but was intended as a warning shot. Thompson did
not file any criminal charge against Officer Mabry.
On July 19th the grand jury assembled in Santa Fe, heard the
evidence, and declared the death of Roy Gallegos justifiable homicide. In reaching this conclusion the grand jury cleared Officer Mabry
of any criminal charge and declared that the shot which killed Roy
Gallegos was a warning shot.
It is reasonable to suppose that Mr. Thompson's instructions to
the grand jury shared with them the decision handed down by the
79. Id. at 12, col. 1.
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Supreme Court of New Mexico in 1937 in the case of State v.
Vargas.8 This case turned on the definition of when deadly force is
necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner. In that decision the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction (for voluntary manslaughter)
of a Taos County Deputy Sheriff who had shot and killed a runaway
prisoner who had pelted the officer with rocks.
In addition to the New Mexico statute on justifiable homicide and
the official interpretation of that statute by the Supreme Court,
other standards are available to the citizenry of New Mexico for
judging the "necessity" of the death of Roy Gallegos.
Chapter 4, Article 1, Section 21 of the Rules and Regulations of
the New Mexico State Police authorizes an arresting officer who is
being "feloniously attacked ...to use deadly force when all other

means of accomplishing the arrest... fails." The same passage, however, warns the arresting officer that "The risk of possible liability
for the use of excessive force far outweighs the necessity of preventing the escape of such a person."
When asked for an explication of this passage in the State Police
Regulations, Wirt Jones, a veteran agent of the F.B.I. and now
Director of the New Mexico State Law Enforcement Academy, said,
"In our courses we follow the longstanding policy of the F.B.I.: You
do not shoot a fleeing man."' ' Douglas Davis, a police instructor at
the New Mexico Academy, when queried about the instruction given
on this point in his classes to novice police officers, replied, "It is
definitely stressed that [the police officers) will only fire when their
life is in danger or [when] they are in danger of bodily harm." 8 2
The Santa Fe Police Department has its own course of police
instruction. One of the instructors in this program is State Police
Sergeant Melvin West. When asked the content of his instruction on
this question, West said that all members of the Santa Fe Police
Department are formally instructed that "[tihe use of deadly force
is not justified for crimes against property, such as a burglary when
there is no one else in the building."'8 3
It is impossible for the average citizen, reading the records available to the public, to reconcile Officer Mabry's deliberate use of
deadly force against an unarmed, drug-intoxicated, fleeing teenager
with these several explicit standards laid down by the Rules and
Regulations of the State Police, by the pedagogical norms of the New
Mexico Law Enforcement Academy, and by the training program of
the Santa Fe Police Department.
80.
81.
82.
83.

42 N.M. 1, 74 P.2d 62 (1937).
Gallegos, supra note 84, at 12, col. 3.
Id.
Id.
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Citizens not members of the grand jury in Santa Fe and not privy
to the instructions given to the grand jury by District Attorney
Thompson can only speculate on how the killing of Roy Gallegos
could possibly be classified as justifiable homicide under the statutory definition of this defense in New Mexico. As in the case of PaGreen, this defense turns on the definition of what is "necessary"
killing.
Roy Gallegos now lies buried in Rosario Cemetery in Santa Fe.
And, according to the verdict of his fellow citizens in Santa Fe, his
death was "necessary" for the common good of the citizens of New
Mexico.
84

THE KILLING OF BETTY GRIFFITHS

On the afternoon of August 10, 1971, in Albuquerque's South
Valley, Betty Griffiths, age 16, was riding in a car with some friends.
They parked in front of Boy's Market, a grocery store, and Betty
entered the store alone. The clerk on duty was Robert Lee Goodwin,
age 33, whose father is the owner of this store. The girl presented a
signed check for $33 to the clerk.
Sensing that the check might be either stolen or forged, the clerk
went to a telephone to verify the signature. At this .point Betty
quickly left the store, without making any purchase, without waiting
for any change, and without taking the check. Goodwin, armed with
a .38 calibre revolver, took off in pursuit of the girl. She did not
re-enter the car but fled down the street on foot. Goodwin caught up
with her after a chase of two blocks. In the struggle which followed,
Goodwin wrestled the girl to the ground. At this point Goodwin
fired one shot from the .38. The bullet entered the girl's skull at her
chin and passed out the top of her head. She died two days later.
No charges were filed against Goodwin but on August 18th the
facts of the case were presented by the District Attorney of Bernalillo County to the grand jury. On the same afternoon the grand
jury declared that the death of Betty Griffiths was an act of justifiable homicide.8
84. Factual data used in compiling this section of this paper was taken from the following sources: Griffiths v. Boy's Super Market, Inc., Civil No. 9-71-00687 (Dist. Ct. Bernalillo
County, N.M., filed Sept. 24, 1971); Albuquerque Journal, Aug. 19, 1971, at A-2, col. 1 &
2; Albuquerque Journal, Aug. 11, 1971, at A-1, col. 8; interview with Mrs. Albert C.
Griffiths, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Nov. 28, 1971.
85. The statute in New Mexico governing justifiable homicide by a citizen is similar to
but slightly different from that governing justifiable homicide by a police officer. It reads as
follows:
Homicide is justifiable when committed by any person in any of the following cases:
A. When committed in the necessary defense of his life, his family or his
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The facts surrounding the killing of Betty Griffiths do not fit any
one of the three grounds for justifiable homicide by a citizen in New
Mexico. At the time of her death she was unarmed. She was at no
time an aggressor and posed no threat to the person or the property
of the storekeeper. She was in full flight from the man who killed
her. She had never actually cashed the check she originally presented.
She had obtained no merchandise from the grocery store.
Citizens reading the news account of the death of this sixteen year
old girl might well ask, especially if they have any knowledge of the
statutory requirements for the defense of justifiable homicide in New
Mexico, how a grand jury could possibly decide that her death was in
any way commensurable with any injury she allegedly intended to
inflict on the storekeeper or his property. However, according to the
verdict of a grand jury of her fellow citizens in Bernalillo County, her
death was somehow "necessary" for the common good of the
citizens of New Mexico.
ANALYSES OF FIVE "NO BILLS"
Taken together these five case histories lend current support to the
conclusion of attorney Leon Friedman that "grand juries... have
lost their way." 8
The fact that a U.S. Senator would call for a
federal grand jury to investigate the findings of a state grand jury, 8'
that a special grand jury, called in response to a public outcry, could
return thirteen indictments against the same law enforcement officers who had just been exonerated by a grand jury in the same
county, 8 8 that a blue-ribbon presidential commission and a state
grand jury investigating precisely the same facts could reach diametrically opposed conclusions, 8 9 would seem to justify the conclusion
that grand juries no longer enjoy or deserve the public confidence
they once had.
The case histories cited above also lend credence to the growing

86.
87.
88.
89.

property, or in necessarily defending against any unlawful action directed
against himself, his wife or family;
B. When committed in the lawful defense of himself or of another and when
there is a reasonable ground to believe a design exists to commit a felony or to
do some great personal injury against such person or another, and there is
imminent dangerthat the design will be accomplished; or
C. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to
apprehend any person for any felony committed in his presence, or in lawfully
suppressing any riot, or in necessarily and lawfully keeping and preserving the
peace. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-8 (Repl. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
Friedman, supra note 2, at E8, col. 1.
American Report, supra note 56, at 2.
See text accompanying note 50, supra.
See text accompanying notes 57 and 58, supra.
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public opinion that the grand jury is no longer the best instrument for
assuring justice in the indictment of persons suspected of crime.
Many knowledgeable persons are increasingly puzzled if not angered
at the evident discrepancy between the statutes defining justifiable
homicide and the decisions of grand juries applying these statutes to
specific homicides. Such persons, many of them lawyers and jurists,
fimd it increasingly difficult to make the act of faith our system has
traditionally asked all citizens to make in the grand jury system. 9 0
On the record of these five cases, reasonable and temperate
citizens could argue that Governor Rhodes and his special prosecutors crassly manipulated the state grand jury in Ohio; that Illinois
State's Attorney Hanrahan controlled the deliberations of the Cook
County Grand Jury and directed its verdict; that Judge Power's crude
attempts to bulldoze the Special Grand Jury in Cook County would
almost certainly have succeeded, had it not been for the courage and
integrity of Barnabas Sears; and that the conclusions of justifiable
homicide reached by grand juries in Lincoln, Santa Fe, and Bernalillo
Counties, investigating the deaths of Paul Green, Roy Gallegos, and
Betty Griffiths are on their face contrary both to the statutory and
the decisional law of the State of New Mexico. 9
The specific, radical purpose of grand jury investigations is to
decide whether there is an actionable criminal charge against a person
suspected of some form of criminality. A true bill returned by a
grand jury proves neither guilt nor innocence. It merely states that
the jury panel concurs in the opinion that there seems to be enough
evidence for or against a person to bring on his case for trial or to
dismiss it.
In each of the cases just cited the grand juries decided that the
evidence did not warrant a trial. And yet, four of those five cases are
back in court today, and the fifth will probably be there soon. The
reason these several causes are back in court, on either criminal or
civil charges (of wrongful death), is that competent and courageous
attorneys have persuaded the courts that there is an arguable case at
the root of each of these fact-situations.
Apropos the Kent State killings, a civil action for the wrongful
death of Allison Krause, filed by her father, has already survived an
appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth District.9 2
In Illinois, contrary to the findings of the county grand jury and
90. Friedman, supra note 2. See also Tigar, An Eight-Point Indictment of the Grand Jury
System, Center Report, Dec. 1971, at 13-14. This article, a paper recently prepsented by
Michael Tigar at the Center For The Study of Democratic Institutions, is a penetrating
criticism of the fundamental lack of due process in the operations of grand juries as they
function now.
91. See text accompanying notes 29, 30, 40, 59, 77, 80, 83 and 85, supra.
92. American Report, supra note 56, at 2, col. 2.
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the county coroner's jury, the case of criminal conspiracy against the
state's attorney and twelve police officers is currently being prepared
for trial. 9 3

In Santa Fe, despite a grand jury decision that no arguable case
could lie against Officer Vance Mabry, a civil action for wrongful
death will probably be filed against him in District Court.9"
In Albuquerque, summons and complaint in a civil suit for wrongful death have already been filed against the grocery clerk who killed
Betty Griffiths' s
At this date no civil action is pending in Ruidoso against Officer
Brooks for his killing of Paul Green. It would appear, however, that
the family of Paul Green may well soon file charges of wrongful
death against Officer Brooks, even though the Grand Jury of Lincoln
County has said the facts of that case do not warrant any criminal
charge.9

6

From Anglo-Norman times until recent decades the grand jury has
acquired a good name as a shield protecting the citizenry from arbitrary prosecution by the state and from false charges by their
fellows. However, the modern development of procedural protections, particularly in criminal actions, has largely usurped these
traditional functions of the grand jury.
The decisions cited above make at least an arguable case that in
many instances political officers or prosecuting attorneys now
control and direct grand juries in order to protect narrow and subjective interests contrary to the common good and even to shield
from prosecution law officers whose conduct on its face violates the
law. To say all this is not to say that opposite conclusions were
necessary in any or all of the cases cited above, but rather to say that
in each instance there is at least an arguable charge of criminal
conduct against the persons responsible for the nine listed homicides.
And in each of these instances the grand jury said there is no such
arguable case to be raised.

THE LIMITS OF DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE

By a curious recent shift in its allegiance the grand jury has lost its
historical identity as a shield protecting innocent citizens from
unwarranted charges by officers of the law, and has become a shield
93. See text accompanying note 52, supra.
94. Interview with Joan Friedland, Counsel for the family of Roy Gallegos, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Nov. 29, 1971.
95. Griffiths v. Boy's Super Market, Inc., Civil No. 9-71-00687 (Dist. Ct. Bernalillo
County, N.M., filed Sept. 24, 1971).
96. Rowen, The Politicsof Murder, The New Mexico Review, Dec. 1971, at 5, col. 1.
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protecting officers of the law from possible criminal charges by the
citizenry. The grand jury has thus become in effect an administrative
agency, executing in secrecy and with unlimited discretionary power,
the policies, also determined in secret, of law enforcement officers
Who continue to maintain the fiction that the grand jury is a free and
autonomous body impartially ferreting out objective truth. This
proposition is simply no longer believable.
In the uncharted land of discretionary justice and selective enforcement of the law the once virtuous grand jury has, to borrow the
words of Jefferson, [fallen victim] "to the will and designs of
power." 9 '

Discretion in the exercise of police or prosecutorial power is both
good and necessary. It is, however, a discretion that has grown to
unexpected proportions with few checks on its misuse, aside from
the native integrity of its users or the intervention of such unforeseen
participants as Barnabas Sears or the corrective decrees of courts of
appeal. In an excellent series of lectures entitled Discretionary
Justice,9" Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has put the glass of scholarly scrutiny on the curious historical process whereby police and
public prosecutors have become administrative agents exercising wide
discretionary powers, yet accounting to no bar of review for their
possible abuse of such discretion.
The complex government of twentieth century society has found
it necessary and desirable to delegate larger and larger amounts of
discretion to administrative and regulatory agencies on every level of
government. However, contemporaneously with this delegation has
come a variety of legislative controls tailored to the needs of different agencies and marking the permissible limits for the exercise of
such discretion.
In the field of discretionary justice, however, the development of
controls has not followed the pattern of other administrative
agencies, partly because police and prosecutors have not usually been
considered administrative agents, and partly because American
prosecutors and police officers have come to believe that they
deserve the unique privilege of "discretionary power... completely
uncontrolled."
Contrasting this American tradition with the West German pattern, Davis readily favors the latter:
The seeming unanimity of American prosecutors that their discretionary power must be completely uncontrolled is conclusively
contradicted by the experience of West Germany, where the dis97. Padover, supra note 1, at 127.
98. K. Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
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cretionary power of prosecutors is so slight as to be almost nonexistent, and almost all they do is closely supervised.
I think we Americans should learn from other nations that the huge
discretionary power of prosecutors need not be unconfined, unstructured, and unchecked. We should re-examine the assumptions to
which our drifting has led us ....99
Davis wisely refrains in this passage from any sinister implication
that the manipulation of discretionary justice in our system of law is
a deliberate plot. He calls it merely a process of unplanned and
unintentional "drifting," whereby "ungranted power of selective
enforcement [of the law] has been assumed by police and by
prosecutors at all levels . ."' 00
In the same lecture, Davis warns that it is high time for the unexamined assumptions underlying this process of drift to be
re-examined. One such basic assumption, accepted as axiomatic
among many prosecutors, is that their office owes greater protection
to the police than to the citizenry at large. This assumption is categorically false and yet it is regularly invoked by prosecutors, and by

grand juries whose only guidance and direction come from prosecuting attorneys.'

0'

When Davis speaks of the "best administrative agencies" he means
those with such procedural norms as openness, full disclosure,
public records, equal treatment, accountability, published rules, and
the availability of appeal. Judged by these norms the secrecy of
much discretionary justice, as decided by police and prosecutors
today, fails to measure up to the minimal standards of procedural
due process. And nowhere in the legal system is this criticism more
valid than in its application to the grand jury method of bringing
individual criminal indictments.
CONCLUSION
Defenders of the grand jury system of indictment might argue that
it is not beyond repair and deserves to be rehabilitated. Possibly,
they argue, it is not too late to adopt Jefferson's suggestion that
99. Id. at 224.
100. Id. at 219.
101. In exposing the fallacy of this secret premise Davis minces no words:
In our entire system of law and government, the greatest concentrations of
unnecessary discretionary power over individual parties are not in the regulatory agencies but are in police and prosecutors. Unfortunately, our traditional
legal classifications-"administrative law," "the administrative process," and
"administrative agencies"- have customarily excluded police and prosecutors.
[T] here has been a failure to transfer know-how from advanced agencies, such
as the federal regulatory agencies, to such backward agencies as the police
departments of our cities. I think that both police and prosecutors, federal as
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grand jurors be elected by vote of their peers in every county of each
state. Such a procedure would undoubtedly recruit for grand jury
service persons of sufficient independence of mind and talent to
protect jury panels from their all but total dependence on prosecutors in the present system. Even among articulate critics of grand
jury decisions one seldom hears the charge of venality or corruption
on the part of jurors. The typical criticism is that the jurors are
assured independence by law but in practice must rely on their own
members or on the prosecutor to chart their course. Regularly the
helpful prosecutor is only too happy to be their navigator and to
guide them to his home port.
Theoretically one could argue that rehabilitation of the grand jury
system by new methods of jury selection is possible. The larger question remains, however: Is it desirable? In his comprehensive study of
the grand jury, Wayne Morse concluded that this system, as a device
for bringing criminal indictments, was too expensive, too cumbersome, too inefficient, too slow, too vulnerable to outside pressures,
and too likely to result in a miscarriage of justice to be worth the
effort and cost of revamping its procedures." 0 2
The Morse study was published in 1931. Its focus of investigation
and its conclusions are remarkably fresh today, showing few signs of
being dated. However, in the four decades since its completion the
erosion of public confidence in the grand jury system of indictment
has been so great that the present writer would seriously doubt the
wisdom or the possibility of trying to rehabilitate this once healthy
but now corrupted institution.
In the spectrum of problems currently troubling our system of
criminal justice by far the greater effort of study and reform has
been concentrated at what Davis calls the "rules end" of the spectrum rather than at the other end of "discretionary justice." Davis
well as state and local, should be governed by many principles that have been
created by and for our best administrative agencies.
The police are among the most important policy-makers of our entire society.
And they make far more discretionary determinations in individual cases than
any other class of administrators; I know of no close second. Davis, Supra note
98, at 222. (Emphasis added.)
102. The three principal conclusions of the Morse study, based on detailed questionnaires answered by hundreds of judges and attorneys were that:
1. The grand jury should be retained as a special instrumentality for investigating charges of political fraud or of corruption among public officer-holders;
2. The grand jury should be dropped as a regular mode of bringing criminal
indictments;
3. The process of filing a criminal information should replace indictment by
grand jury, except in those rare cases where the judge deems it necessary or
where the prosecuting attorney can by motion demonstrate to the judge that
some particular public good would be accomplished by convening a grand
jury. Morse, supra note 6, at 273-74.
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says flatly that the rules end is the easy half of the task. Rules are
easier to make, to explicate, and to study than are those myriad
prudential judgments to be made by persons exercising wide-ranging
discretion. The latter field is uncharted and has fewer surveyor's
monuments fixed in the terrain to guide scholars who would study or
chart this vast region of jurisprudence. The present paper, with its
frequent use of newspaper stories, oral interviews, prudential judgments, and personalized interpretation is but one modest step in the
direction urged by Professor Davis when he counseled his confreres
in administrative law:
If we stay within the comfortable areas where jurisprudence scholars
work and concern ourselves mostly with statutory and judge-made
law, we can at best accomplish no more than to refine what is
already tolerably good. To do more than that, we have to open our
eyes to the reality that justice to individual parties is administered
more outside courts than in them, and we have to penetrate the
unpleasant areas of discretionary determinations by police and
prosecutors and other administrators, where huge concentrations of
injustice invite drastic reforms.' 03
One of those unpleasant areas mentioned by Davis is that of
criminal indictment by grand jury. Challenging this venerable institution could well prove non-habit forming for young lawyers or law
school students. Nonetheless it is a field ripe for reform. Those who
would reform it might well adopt as their model the sage counsel of
one judge from Wisconsin who answered the Morse questionnaire in
1930 with these words:
I can think of no possible use for a grand jury where there is a
conscientious prosecutor. Where the prosecutor is no good I cannot
imagine where a grand jury is going to make him any better .... 104
It is the considered conclusion of the present writer that conscientious prosecutors working to file charges by criminal information in
open court are far more likely to advance the cause of justice in our
society than are the indictments handed down by the secret, unstructured, leaderless, and unaccountable deliberations of grand
juries as these bodies operate today.
Criminal indictment by grand jury is often praised as an ornament
of distinction in Anglo-American common law. In England this
venerable arm of the law was abolished by Act of Parliament in
1933.' 0' A span of 38 years is a decent interval for us to allow
before rushing to adopt any innovation in the law merely because the
English have done it already.
103. Davis, supra note 98, at 215.
104. Morse, supra note 6, at 271 n. 210.
105. Plucknett, supra note 12, at 112 n. 1.

